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Abstract
This paper investigates the causes of corruption in the Italian regions for the period 1980 
to 2002 by selecting a number of hypotheses assessed in the literature. Corruption turns out to 
be driven by the level of per capita income and of education. While, as expected, income is 
negatively related with corruption, education is not; its positive impact on corruption can be 
explained as if corruption in Italy was typically a ‘white collars’ phenomenon during the 1980s 
and 1990s.  Moreover the size of public investments in both the economic and politico-
institutional dimensions seems to be a crucial factor in the explanation of the phenomenon. 
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1. Introduction
 Corresponding Author, Nadia Fiorino, Dipartimento di Sistemi e Istituzioni per l’Economia, Università 
degli   Studi   dell’Aquila,   Via   Giovanni   Falcone,   25   -   67100   Coppito-L’Aquila,   ITALY.  E-mail: 
nadia.fiorino@univaq.it. We would like to thank Luisanna Onnis, Fabio Padovano, Simona Scabrosetti, and the 
participants to the 2008 Società Italiana di Economia Pubblica Conference and to the 2009 European Public Choice 
Society Meeting. The usual caveat applies.The literature on the historical, cultural, economic and political determinants of 
corruption is quite developed: countries characterized by common law systems that embody 
greater protection of property against the state (La Porta et al., 1999), less hierarchical religions 
like Protestantism (La Porta et al., 1997), higher levels of income and education (Lipset, 1960), 
less government expenditures and regulations (Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003), lower diversity 
along ethnic and income lines (Mauro, 1995; Alesina et al., 2002) and higher  degrees of 
civicness of the population (Putnam, 1993) are expected to be less corrupt. Mixed predictions 
have been provided by the literature about the impact on corruption of federalism (Weingast, 
1995; Breton, 1996; Tanzi, 1995)  and of electoral systems (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; 
Lijphart, 1999).
The empirical research however faces major difficulties in measuring corruption rates. 
Recently economists and political scientists have used indexes of ‘perceived’ corruption 
constructed by business risk analysts and polling organizations based on survey responses of 
businessmen and local residents. Among others, Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. (1997, 1999), 
Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Persson et al. (2003) used those indexes to investigate the causes 
of corruption in cross-national analyses. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International places Italy in 
the same group of several Eastern European, Asian and South-American countries with a score 
of  about 5.2 calculated in a range between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). Indeed 
since its unification in 1861, the Italian political system has been characterized by a strong 
interaction between politicians, bureaucrats and citizens aimed to reap high benefits through 
special laws or through political appointments (the so-called clientelismo). In the 1980s yet the 
increasing practice of bribing politicians and bureaucrats associated with the ongoing fiscal 
crisis of the public finances began to modify the general attitude towards corruption and to 
spread greater intolerance towards it in the public opinion. Del Monte and Papagni (2007) show 
that corruption crimes increased steadily between the mid-1970s and the first half of the 1990s, 
especially in the Southern regions, and slightly decreased after 1993 as a consequence of the so-
called Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) campaign undertaken by the judiciary system. However, the distribution of corruption crimes is not homogeneous across the territorial areas of the country. 
Our paper is an attempt to take account of this differentiation by selecting a number of 
hypotheses assessed in the literature about the causes of corruption and applying them to the 
Italian regions. In order to comparatively test the explanatory power of these hypotheses we 
built a set of measures of the level of corruption and of the economic and politico-institutional 
determinants on regional basis for the period 1980 to 2002. 
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we present the leading theories of what 
causes corruption. The empirical framework is analyzed in Section 3 where variables and data 
are described. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks.
2. The determinants of corruption: a review of the literature 
It is difficult to fully capture the economic and social significance of corruption as well as 
its causes and consequences. The economic literature tries to investigate why public officials 
misuse their office for private gain more frequently in some countries than in others by 
identifying economic as well as social, cultural and political variables that correlate with the 
incidence of corruption. If we define corruption as a crime made by public officials for personal 
gain (as in  Rose-Ackerman, 1975)  the economic theory of corruption follows closely the 
economic theory of crime (Becker, 1968). The potential criminal, in this case a public official, 
weighs   the   benefits   of   crime   against   its   costs.  The   various   economic   theories   on  the 
determinants of corruption are thus driven by this cost-benefit calculus of the potential criminal. 
National or local characteristics, however, will influence the level of corruption as they alter the 
benefits and costs of crime. 
The most relevant cost come from the risk of being caught and punished that depends in 
turn on the effectiveness of the country’s legal system and on the degree of protection it 
provides to private individuals harmed by corrupt acts of public officials
1. 
The risk of being caught may be higher in more democratic systems where competitors for 
office have an incentive to disclose and publicize the incumbent’s misuse of office during the 
1 On the impact of different legal systems – common law versus civil law – on corruption  see, among others, La 
Porta et al., 1999elections. This hypothesis is based on an extensive literature originated by Lipset (1960) that 
considers political attention a luxury good, education a way to lead individuals towards having a 
higher value of staying politically involved, civic engagement a channel towards closer 
monitoring (Putnam, 1993; Glaeser et al., 2004). Therefore, voters with higher income and 
education are expected to be both more willing and capable to monitor public employees and to 
take action when the latter violate the law. 
The literature considers also that the effectiveness of a legal system is rooted not only in the 
formulations of the laws but also in the ‘legal culture’, that is the expectations and practices that 
inform the way they are enforced. Different conceptions of the social role of law may imply 
dissimilar perceptions of the gravity of corruption. Besides losing their jobs, corrupt officials 
face   a   social   stigma   that   highly   depends   on  the   prevailing   moral   norms   and   cultural 
expectations. In other words, the more dissonance occurs between the law and those norms, the 
lower legitimacy the legal system will tend to have and the higher will be then the degree of 
corruption (Treisman, 2000). 
The benefits of corruption come from public agents being able to allocate resources to 
private individuals, including the right to bypass certain regulations. Then the official uses his 
power to generate some gains for the private individual beyond those he would receive without 
state interventions. State measures such as regulations, taxation, public economic activities may 
be used to give the private agent advantages wit respect to others in the market and in return the 
private agent pays the official part of the rent. Therefore, the larger the public sector and the 
greater the number of regulations of the economy, the greater will be the opportunities for 
helping private actors either to benefit or to evade these regulations, increasing the possibilities 
for corrupt practices (Tanzi, 1994; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003; Adsera et al., 2003). Countries 
characterized by more regulations will experience higher levels of corruption as public officials 
and private individuals will have more resources to steal and more rules to exploit.
Another set of theories on the determinants of corruption has focused on the effect of 
ethnic fragmentation on corruption and wasteful redistribution (Mauro, 1995; Fearon and Laitin, 
1996; Alesina et al., 2002). If an area is worn out by ethnic divisions and leaders tend to allocate resources towards groups of their own ethnicity, then members of one ethnic group might 
continue to support a leader of their own group, even if he is known to be corrupt. Furthermore, 
other forms of division, such as income inequality, may also reduce voters’ desire to oppose 
corruption since they will focus on the redistribution rather than on the honesty of government 
officials. An increase in income inequality would positively affect the degree of corruption.
More  recently, Persson and Tabellini (1999) and Persson et al. (2003) suggest the 
existence of a systematic link between corruption and electoral rules. Larger voting districts are 
associated with less corruption, whereas larger shares of candidates elected from party lists with 
more corruption.  Majoritarian systems are more accountable because voters seek consensus 
among individuals rather than among parties, which should restrict rent extraction. Then 
majoritarian elections are more effective in deterring political rents since the outcome of an 
election is generally more sensitive to the incumbent’s performance. By developing a different 
line of reasoning Lijphart (1999) argues that proportional systems are more accountable than 
majoritarian because they lead to policy decisions closer to voters’ preferences, which 
discourages corrupt practices. 
Differences among countries in the extent of corruption may also depend on the degree 
to which officials compete against each other to sell mutually substitutable benefits to private 
agents (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993). Rose-Ackerman (1978) suggested that the existence of 
competition at the level of the officials receiving bribes reduces corruption. When a bureaucrat 
provides a scarce service, the existence of competing officials to reapply in case of being asked 
a bribe will reduce the equilibrium amount of corruption. Put it differently, when officials 
compete to sell the same or substitutable benefits to private actors, the price they can charge is 
driven down zero. This logic motivates two alternative arguments about the relationship 
between federalism and corruption: 1) federal systems may induce more honest and efficient 
governments because of the competition between jurisdictions (Weingast, 1995; Breton, 1996); 
2) Corruption may be higher at local level because the relationships between private agents and 
public officials are closer and more frequent and because the potential briber has to influence 
only a segment of the government (Tanzi, 1995).  To our knowledge there is only one empirical contribution to the analysis of the 
determinants of corruption in the Italian Regions by Del Monte and Papagni (2006) for the 
period 1963-2001. Their estimates show that economic variables (government consumption and 
level of economic development) as well as political and cultural factors (party fragmentation, 
presence of voluntary organizations and absenteeism at national elections) affect corruption in 
Italy. The major shortcoming of Del Monte and Papagni (2007) lies in the lack of a complete 
regional data set for all the variables they use as determinants of corruption for the overall 
period. To face this severe problem they resort to a mix of national and regional measures. In 
order to propose a more accurate interpretation of the phenomenon at local level we decided to 
restrict our sample period and provide a full set of regional variables and data that measure the 
determinants of corruption. 
3. The empirical determinants of corruption
In this Section we select the hypotheses developed in the literature about the causes of 
cross-national variation in corruption that seem to be more suitable to explain the phenomenon 
in the Italian Regions
2. We take into account that many factors are likely to be correlated, 
causing problems of causal relationship and endogeneity; at the same time some variables may 
capture more than only one underlying hypothesis causing difficulties in the interpretation of the 
results. All these problems need to be controlled for in the empirical analysis by including in the 
regression all factors simultaneously (given that our data set contain enough variation to 
distinguish clearly among them) and by using the Instrumental Variable methodology. 
3.1 Variables and data description
The dependent variable. Real abuse of political and administrative office can show up both 
in corruption and, more generally, in misgovernance. As Tanzi (1998) observes, it is difficult to 
define corruption in abstract, also because corruption is illegal and consequently hidden. 
Cultural and legal differences across countries make it hard to investigate corruption without 
2  The Italian Constitution, promulgated in 1948, foresees the principle of decentralization of the government 
functions and the establishment of Regional Governments (Article 5 and Title V of the Constitution). Italy has thus 
been divided in 20 Regions. Five of them, the first to be established between 1948 and 1963, enjoy a special statute 
(Regioni a Statuto Speciale, or RSS), because of their multilingual status, borderline position or particularly low level 
of development. The remaining 15 Regions characterized by an ‘ordinary statute’ (Regioni a Statuto Ordinario, or 
RSO) were established in 1970, 22 years after the Constitutional provision.taking country-specific features into account. Good proxies for political corruption should thus 
offer reliable information on the unlawful abuse of political power, as well as a strong level of 
comparability across different countries. 
Following Rose-Ackerman (1975) and Glaeser and Saks (2006), we define corruption as 
crimes by public officials for personal gain; then in a first step we measure corruption as the 
number of regional government officials prosecuted for corrupt practices relative to the 
population over the 1980-2002 period. These prosecution levels capture the extent to which 
prosecutors charge and accuse public officials for misconduct in each of the twenty regions. The 
crimes that we consider are based on the Libro II, titolo II (crimes against the Public 
Administration) of the Italian Criminal Law as reported in the Annals of Judicial Statistics of 
the ISTAT (various issues). We believe that these data on prosecutions are more reliable than 
those from  Casellario Giudiziale  on convicted corruption crimes because they are able to 
capture part of the hidden corruption shelved by corrupt judges.
Generally, cross-countries studies on corruption rely on opinion surveys resulting in the 
Corruption  Perceptions   Index  (CPI)   produced  by  Transparency  International
3  or   similar 
measures
4. This index is constructed from a number of individual surveys of businessmen or 
local populations of the relevant countries, as well as from several ratings compiled by staff of 
economic risk analysis firms on the basis of reports from country experts. While measures like 
the CPI contain valuable information, they suffer of a few shortcomings: first, the meaning of 
corruption is subjective and can vary greatly from one country to the other one; furthermore, the 
types of the corrupt activities could be substantially different in each country making 
comparative analyses even more difficult. In addition, they are computed on country’s basis and 
this a fortiori supports our choice of an alternative measure of corruption.
Using prosecution rates as a measure for corruption bumps against the circumstance that in 
corrupt countries the judicial system is itself corrupt and fewer people will be charged with 
corrupt practices. We consider this problem of the existence of a general corruption spread 
3 This index is computed for 54 countries from 1980 to 2003 and is calculated as the simple average of a number of 
different surveys assessing each country’s performance in a given year. 
4 For a general discussion on these indexes see Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003); for a comparison of different 
corruption measures for Italy see Del Monte and Papagni (2007).through the whole system, even though in Italy the judicial system is centralized and then 
relatively more isolated from local corruption. Although the legal system is the same in all the 
Italian regions, its degree of legitimacy is not. Even if he does not specifically deal with 
corruption, Putnam (1993) shows that the different degrees of trust, civicness and legal culture 
have an impact on the effectiveness of regional governments in Italy.
Moreover, such a measure reflects only the ‘revealed’ corruption, most likely by leaving 
part of the phenomenon hidden. A first look of table 1a highlights this problem. The table shows 
the average per capita prosecutions for 1980-2002 per 100,000 inhabitants. As expected the 
Northern regions are less corrupt than the Center and Sourthern regions; however, the ranking is 
not completely in line with the ‘common opinion’ about the different extent of corruption in the 
Italian regions. As matter of fact, prosecutions for corrupt practices in the Corte d’Appello 
district of Reggio Calabria
5  in the last twenty years resulted in two convictions only. 
Nevertheless, similar conditions characterize other districts of Calabria as well as districts of 
other ‘perceived’ corrupt regions, like Sicily, Campania and Sardinia (Davigo and Mannozzi, 
2007). To take into account the hidden corruption and avoid potential bias between official 
statistics and ‘true’ data, we consider the existing link between corruption and associative 
crimes (crimes ex art. 416 and 416 bis of the Italian Criminal Law). This implies that, as the so-
called Mani Pulite criminal trials confirmed, corruption emerges not only as corrupt practices 
but also as associative crimes in the most ‘perceived’ corrupt regions. Then we construct a 
composite index annually computed per each region as per capita prosecutions multiplied for 
per capita associative crimes. Table 1b ranks this index from the least to the most corrupt 
regions. This ranking lines up reasonably well with our pre-conceived notions about the real 
distribution of corruption in Italy. 






















Table 1b - Regions with most and least prosecutions and associative




















Sicilia 244 The explanatory variables.  To test the Lipset hypothesis we measure the region’s 
economic development and level of education by using respectively regional GDP per capita 
and secondary school enrolment ratio for male and female population. 
Social and cultural factors may be different in the various regions even though the 
institutions as well as the legal system are the same. Direct democracy institutions signal the 
degree of civicness of the population
6 and can be also interpreted as a measure of people’s 
attitude against the practices of corruption. This allows us to   control for the degree of 
corruption generally ‘accepted and tolerated’ by the system as a whole, since in corrupt regions 
the judicial system may be itself corrupt and fewer people may be charged with corrupt 
practices. As a measure of direct democracy we use voters’ participation to referenda and expect 
a negative sign of the coefficient of this variable.
Another set of theories on the determinants of corruption has focused on the presence of 
the state into the economy. More regulations and greater government size create a potential for 
corruption since more resources may be stolen and more rules exploited or subverted (Tanzi, 
1994; Glaeser and Shleifer, 2003). We test this hypothesis by using the capital public 
expenditure, the number of regional laws (or, alternatively, the number of articles of regional 
laws) and the number of legislators
7.
Since Italian regions are overall ethnically homogeneous
8, but show relevant income 
differentials between the North and the South we also test the hypothesis that as voters become 
more diverse along the income line, they will focus on the redistribution rather than on the 
honesty of government officials (Mauro, 1995; Alesina et al., 2002). We expect that an increase 
in income inequality will positively affect the degree of corruption.  We measure income 
inequality with the Gini index calculated using data on family income per regions.  
6 Though he does not specifically deal with corruption, Putnam (1993) shows that the effectiveness of regional 
governments in Italy is lower where the degree of trust and civicness are lower.
7 On the basis of the law passed in 1968 (n. 108) the number of regional legislators was 30 in regions with less than 
one million inhabitants; 40 for regions with more than one million inhabitants; 50 for regions with more than three 
million inhabitants; 60 for regions with more than four million inhabitants; and, finally 80 for regions with more than 
six million inhabitants.
8 The only exceptions in this respect is represented by the German minority in Trentino-Alto-Adige and French 
minority in Valle d’Aosta that are both excluded from our estimates.Political fragmentation as a result of the electoral rules (Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi, 
2003) can be measured by using the Herfindhal index for concentration. The index is built on 
the seats of the majority supporting the regional government with respect to the overall 
legislature and ranges from 0 (a legislature in which each legislator belongs to a different party) 
to 1 (when all members belong to the same party). We then expect a positive impact of this 
measure on corruption. The use of this variable is also suggested by a recent change of the 
regional electoral system occurred in  1995. The mechanism by which the members of the 
regional Council are elected switched from a pure proportional representation to a mixed one. A 
top-up number of seats for the winning coalition is also introduced, so that the absolute majority 
of the legislators will be held by the coalition linked to the regional list that has obtained the 
relative majority of the votes. Furthermore, the law reduced the tenure length of the Council 
from five to two years if the relationship of confidence between the Council and the Cabinet 
breaks down during the first two years. This reform was completed in 1999 when it was 
established that the President of the regional Cabinet is elected by universal and direct suffrage.
Decentralized systems have been considered alternatively either as a potential source of 
corruption or as a source of honesty and efficiency of sub-national governments. Since mid-
1990s and especially with the approbation of federalist  reform in 2001 the Italian regions were 
characterized by a gradual, though slow, process of reduction of grants received by the central 
government associated to an increase of fiscal autonomy. We capture the evolution of the 
decentralization process by using two different variables: 1) a dummy that takes the value of 1 
from 1995 on and 0 before; 2) the share of per capita local taxes over total revenues.
Data sources. Income per capita is the ratio of the regional gross domestic product in real terms 
(1995 base = 100) over the regional population. Data on regional GDP and population are taken 
from Crenos (2004). Data on the regional secondary school enrollment for male and female 
population come from Crenos (2004). Data on the regional participation to referendums and on 
the total number of voters are taken from the Ministero dell’Interno (various years). Data on 
regional legislative output come from the website of the Camera dei Deputati della Repubblica 
italiana. Data on Regional election’s results, used to measure the Herfindhal index of political concentration, are from Istat (1990) and Ministero dell’Interno (various years). We build the 
Gini index using micro-data on the households’ disposable income coming from the Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), conducted by the Bank of Italy (1980; 1986; 1989, 


















 Mean  1.86E-08  0.330655  0.013845  0.047398  53.08556  0.670597  51.68182  0.000370  0.000142  0.610032  0.000149
 Median  5.52E-09  0.329437  0.013724  0.047153  50.00000  0.686400  46.00000  0.000219  2.40E-05  0.632643  0.000114
 Maximum  5.52E-07  0.479429  0.023014  0.065018  90.00000  0.880000  165.0000  0.001794  0.001435  1.303661  0.000759
 Minimum  0.000000  0.236252  0.000800  0.019830  30.00000  0.128000  8.000000  3.34E-05  8.27E-10  0.200333  1.44E-05
 Std. Dev.  6.27E-08  0.036212  0.004192  0.007202  17.70924  0.133744  25.61925  0.000321  0.000252  0.212849  0.000123
 Skewness  6.648611  0.434022 -0.277167 -0.259954  0.503150 -1.226576  1.295616  1.504923  2.406279  0.091105  2.072315
 Kurtosis  49.10177  3.809933  3.283196  3.961819  2.373921  5.691410  5.370545  4.608223  8.536013  3.045466  8.817946
 Jarque-Bera  35875.79  21.96461  6.038315  18.62831  21.88859  206.6606  192.2042  181.4765  838.5104  0.549592  795.1622
 Probability  0.000000  0.000017  0.048842  0.000090  0.000018  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.759727  0.000000
 Observations 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374 374
 Cross 
sections
18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18 18Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the above variables respectively. 
3. Empirical results 
In Section 3 we have presented several hypotheses about the causes of corruption, each deriving 
from a theoretical literature in political science or economics. Since income and education are 
likely to be correlated, however, it would risk omitted variable bias to test hypotheses 
individually without also controlling for alternative hypotheses. Education and income might be 
related to other unobservable factors that are the true explanation for variation in corruption 
across locations. Second, income and education are likely to be endogenous: whether or not 
they cause corruption, corruption may cause them. If a low level of economic development is 
conducive to corruption, corruption itself is known to impede development. Long standing 
corruption might induce capital to flee and reduce the quality of schools, which would produce 
a negative relationship between education and corruption.  Thus we address these problems 
byusing the Instrumental Variables methods or two-stage least squares.  This, however, requires the 
identification of suitable instruments. We then regress: 
Corruption Rate = a Income + b Education  + Other Controls
Another empirical concern is the position of the Lazio in the rank we present in table 1. 
Lazio is the region where the Ministers, and more generally the highest bureaucratic power as 
well as the national legislative branch, are located. Hence in Lazio both the regional and the 
central bureaucracies coexist. Since the Italian criminal law identifies the locus of corruption 
crimes as the place where the exchange of money occurs, phenomena of ‘export’ of corrupt practices in Lazio may emerge. To take account of this possibility we perform our estimation 
with and without Lazio. 
Our sample includes the Italian regions with the exception of Valle d’Aosta and 
Trentino Alto Adige for which the data set is incomplete. Table 3 shows the OLS results. 
Column (1) presents the results of a regression that includes per capita income. As expected, 
income is significantly negative. Furthermore, we  also include in the regression direct 
democracy   institutions,   public   capital   expenditure,   income   inequality   and   degree   of 
decentralization. Public investments are in line with theoretical predictions. Participation to 
referenda as well as income inequality does not seem to have an impact on corruption. The 
decentralization of spending functions and consequently of the power to issue licences, to select 
project to finance, to expand office increase the opportunities for corruption. Most likely for 
local policy makers the probability of being elected was related more to the number of favours 
they could offer to their ‘clients’ than to the efficiency in the provision of public policies.  
In column (2) we replace the income variable with the share of school attainment in the 
region. The significance of education is strong and much more robust than those of the income 
variable. Yet, in contrast with theoretical predictions, the share of school attainment exhibits a 
positive sign. The rest of the results are similar to those presented in column (1). Column (3) 
includes both education and income and confirms the previous findings. In column (4) we 
estimate the model analyzed in column (3) by excluding Lazio to control for possible 
phenomena of ‘export’ of corruption previously underlined. As the results shows, the general 
picture does not change. All the regressions presented in table 3 display an adjusted R
2  that 
explains about the 42% of the variability of the corruption measure in each equation.  The 
negative correlation between education levels and corruption is generally interpreted in the 
empirical work as an indication that the middle-class opposes corruption more because corrupt 
practices are more likely to benefit the lower class (Schlesinger and Meier, 2002 among others). 
2The positive sign of education variable in our regressions seems to suggest though that 
corruption in the Italian regions concerns more educated classes. This is clearly shown in the so-
called Mani Pulite investigation that signed the passing from a system of political patronage to a 
system of corruption that involved legislators, bureaucrats and businessmen. In other words our 
results seem to suggests that corruption of the 1980s and 1990s was typically a ‘white collars’ 
phenomenon. 
Table 3 – OLS results
Dependent variable: Corruption























































Obs. 414 414 414 391
Adj.R









Notes: p-value in parenthesis. Column (4) reports the estimates of the regression in column (3)
that excludes Lazio. 
As the OLS estimates may be biased we apply the Instrumental Variables 
method to deal with the reverse causality between education, income and corruption. Table 
4 replicates the estimations performed in table (3). Column (1) reports the 
results of the equation including per capita income. We use as instrument 
the investments in industry.  In column (2) we show the result of the 
equation   that   excludes   income   and   includes   the   share   of   educated 
population. The equation has been instrumented using the lagged values of 
3education. Finally, column (3) presents the results of the full equation by 
using both the instruments. Column (4) replicates the estimates of column 
(3) excluding Lazio. The Sargan’s over-identification test  maintains that the 
instruments used  in the second stage equations  are exogenous.  Either in OLS or in IV 
estimates we include regional fixed effects to avoid bias from omitted regional specific 
variables (as for example the difference in the attitude towards corruption practices in each 
region) and correct them for heteroskedasticity. Taken as a whole, estimates via the IV method 
do not significantly differ from the OLS results. 
Table 4 – TSLS results
Dependent variable: Corruption





















































Obs. 414 324 342 374
Adj. R
2 - 3.74 0.49 0.45 -0.28
Notes: p-value in parenthesis. The instruments used in column (1), (2), (3) and (4) are the investments in 
industry and the lagged values respectively for income per capita and school attainment. The over-
identification test is Sargan’s statistic.  Columns (4) reports the estimates of the full regression that 
excludes Lazio. 
In Table 5 we turn to deal more specifically with the link between regulation and 
corruption. While in the specification of the model presented in Table 3 and 4 we proxy 
regulation by using public investments, in further specifications we include different measures 
of the size of government, specifically the output of the legislative activity and the size of 
4legislatures (McCormick and Tollison, 1981; Weingast et al., 1981), to capture respectively the 
procedural and the politico-institutional dimension of the regulation. The coefficient on the 
number of regional laws does not turn out significant whereas the number of legislators as 
expression of interest groups’ activity has a positive a significant impact on corruption. 
A further step concerns the role played in the empirical analysis by the dummy variable 
that identifies in 1995 the beginning of a federalist process in Italy. As we mentioned above in 
that year it occurred a change in the electoral system of the regional legislatures from a 
proportional to a mixed one. In Section 2 we emphasize that both the literature on the nexus 
between federalism and corruption, on one side and the literature on the nexus between electoral 
rules and corruption, on the other, provide conflicting predictions about the direction of the 
relation. In our estimates the dummy shows a positive and significant coefficient, i.e. a higher 
degree of decentralization together with a change towards a majoritarian system generate more 
corruption. In order to separate more clearly these two institutional events and to take into 
account their time and spatial dimension we use the share of local taxes over total revenues as a 
measure of the degree of decentralization and the political fragmentation index as a proxy of the 
electoral rules. It turns out that the level of corruption is not affected by the degree of fiscal 
autonomy probably because the latter is quite uniform in the Italian regions during our sample 
period. It is rather the political fragmentation of the regional governments that increases 
corruption   through   its   impact   on   spending   decisions.   Indeed   public   investments   are 
multicollinear with political fragmentation. When we include in the regression the latter, as for 
legislators a positive relation with corruption is established (see Column 5 in Table 5 and 
column 3 in Table 6).
Overall these results (that are confirmed in the IV estimations presented in Table 6) 
suggest that corruption in the Italian regions is driven by the level of per capita income, i.e. poor 
regions are more corrupt than rich ones and by the level of education, showing that corruption 
5was typically a ‘white collars’ phenomenon. Generally the Lipset hypothesis suggests a 
combined interpretation of the negative impact of income and education on corruption. Our 
result on education is only apparently in contrast with the negative relationship between 
economic development and corruption because of two reasons: 1) in Italy education is largely 
provided by the public sector and therefore is basically unrelated to income; and 2) Southern 
regions, that are the most corrupt, are characterized by lower levels of income associated with 
higher   levels   of   education   because   typically   education   represents   a   substitute   for   job 
opportunities in these economies that are structurally weak. Finally, the size of government 
corruption creates scope for corruption; the political channel affects corruption through its 
impact on public investments while the amount of regulation does not. 
Table 5 – OLS results
Dependent variable: Corruption
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
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Notes: p-value in parenthesis. 
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2 -0.103182 0.104643 0.223172
Notes: p-value in parenthesis. The instruments used the investments in industry and the lagged values 
respectively for income per capita and school attainment. The over-identification test is Sargan’s statistic. 
The estimates of the full regression that excludes Lazio do not show substantial differences.
5. Concluding remarks
Our paper is an attempt to investigate the differentiation in the distribution of corruption 
crimes across the Italian territorial areas by selecting a number of hypotheses assessed in the 
literature about the causes of the phenomenon. In order to comparatively test the explanatory 
7power of these hypotheses we built a set of measures of corruption and of economic and 
politico-institutional determinants on regional basis for the period 1980 to 2002. 
Corruption turns out to be driven by the level of per capita income and of education. 
While, as expected, income is negatively related with corruption, education is not; its positive 
impact on corruption can be explained as if education in Italy increases the ability of the private 
and public actors to bypass and evade regulations. The interpretation of this result corroborates 
what it was clearly revealed in the Mani Pulite investigation, namely that corruption in Italy was 
typically a ‘white collars’ phenomenon during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Moreover the size of public investments in both the economic and politico-institutional 
dimensions seems to be a crucial factor in the explanation of the phenomenon suggesting that 
the design of anti-corruption policies should pass through a process of enhancement of the 
quality of the public expenditures as well as of the political decision making process. 
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